

**Is Working-class Representation a Threat to Women and Minorities?**

Nicholas Carnes  
Assistant Professor of Public Policy  
Duke University  
[nicholas.carnes@duke.edu](mailto:nicholas.carnes@duke.edu)

## Abstract

As women and minorities have gained more seats in Congress and state legislatures, working-class Americans have lost ground in these institutions. Does it have to be that way? Are the political fortunes of women and minorities tied to the political misfortunes of the working class? Would greater working-class representation pose a threat to women and minorities? This study develops a simple theory to predict when the descriptive representation of one group will “crowd out” other underrepresented groups. I then use the Local Elections in America Project’s (LEAP) data on California elections to explore the links between the racial, gender, and social class makeup of candidates and officeholders in local and county elections. The representation of workers does not appear to imperil female or minority candidates. To the contrary, many working class candidates *are* women and minorities, and those who aren’t don’t seem to pose any threat to the political progress of other historically underrepresented groups.

**Keywords:** class, race, gender, descriptive representation, inequality

## Who's Afraid of Working-class Government?

In the last few years, scholars have started asking why *working-class Americans*—people who work in manual labor or service industry jobs<sup>1</sup>—make up more than half of the labor force but almost never go on to hold political office (Carnes 2012a; 2013, ch. 6; Sadin

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<sup>1</sup> I define a person as belonging to *the working class* (or having a *blue-collar job*, or as simply a *worker*) if he or she is employed in manual labor jobs (e.g., factory worker) or service industry jobs (e.g., restaurant server). Likewise, I define a person as having a white-collar job if she is not a part of the working class. Of course, there are other ways to measure class—education, income, wealth, family background, subjective perceptions of class, and so on—and many ways to disaggregate occupations. Most modern class analysts agree, however, that any measure of class should be rooted in occupational data, that is, information about how a person earns a living (e.g., Hout, Manza, and Brooks 1995; Weeden and Grusky 2005; Wright 1997). And the distinction between working-class and white-collar seems to be the major class-based dividing line in political opinion in the United States. Research on legislators (Carnes 2012a; 2013) squares with both intuitions: lawmakers from working-class jobs tend to vote significantly differently than legislators from white-collar jobs; however, legislators with higher net worths, more formal education, or well-to-do parents tend not to behave as differently. There are important differences within the working-class and white-collar categories, of course, but the major dividing line is between workers, who tend to support more progressive economic policies, and professionals, who tend to support a more conservative role for government in economic affairs.

2012) and whether it matters that America is governed almost exclusively by wealthy, white-collar professionals (Carnes 2012b; 2013; Grose 2013; Griffin and Anewalt-Remsburg 2013). These questions aren't new, of course. Since the Founding, political observers have worried about the sharply tilted economic and social class makeup of our political institutions (Lewis 1961; Manin 1997). In the 1950s and 1960s, scholars briefly carried out an energetic line of research on how much better off politicians were than their constituents (Beckett and Sunderland 1957; Domhoff 1967; Matthews 1954a; 1954b; Mills 1956; Zeller 1954).

Today's research on the social class makeup of government revives a longstanding tradition in the social sciences and in American political thought. But is it a *dangerous* tradition? Is working-class representation a threat to the interests of other historically underrepresented groups like women or racial and ethnic minorities?<sup>2</sup>

Historically, working-class political organizations have often opposed the interests of women and minorities (Frymer 2008). Of course, in the 21st century, working-class groups do vastly better on this score. Still, as research on the shortage of lower-income and

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<sup>2</sup> Throughout this paper, I use the terms *racial and ethnic minorities* or simply *minorities* to refer to people who are not what the Census Bureau would classify as "white/non-Hispanic." Obviously, this coarse terminology glosses over the enormously complex realities of racial and ethnic distinctions in the United States today. I am stuck with this blunt measurement approach, however, for practical reasons: the Census data on race and ethnicity that make my analysis possible are coarse, too. I hope, however, that future research will examine more fine-grained measures of race and ethnicity than I am able to here.

working-class Americans in our political institutions picks up speed, it is worth asking whether encouraging more blue-collar workers to hold public office might somehow threaten the political progress of women and minorities.

### **When Would Working-class Representation Matter?**

Increasing the number of working-class Americans in public office could diminish the representation of women and minorities in one of two ways.

First, if working-class Americans tend to prefer policies that are opposed to what women or racial and ethnic minorities want, increasing the number of working-class Americans in public office could undermine the *substantive* representation (Pitkin 1967) of women's and minorities' interests.

The available evidence suggests, however, that politicians from the working class tend to have more ideological common ground with women and minorities than white-collar professionals do (see Carnes 2013; Tables A.3 and A.4). Members of Congress who are women, who are racial and ethnic minorities, and who are from the working class *all* tend vote more progressively on economic issues (measured as first-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, AFL-CIO scores, and Chamber of Commerce scores) and on noneconomic issues (measured as second-dimension DW-NOMINATE scores, National Education Association Scores, and ACLU scores). There may be important differences in the representational styles of women, minorities, and workers in Congress, or in the issues they advocate behind the scenes. But in terms of their general ideological orientations, lawmakers from the working class tend to be *more* in step with women and minorities than lawmakers from white-collar professions.

Second, working-class candidates and politicians could also pose a threat to the *descriptive* representation of women and minorities. Adding more working-class Americans to our political institutions could easily “crowd out” other historically underrepresented groups and reverse the numerical gains that women and minorities have made in the last few decades.

The recent history of descriptive representation in this country could certainly be interpreted in those terms. Since the 1950s, women and minorities have gained considerable ground in Congress. Workers have not. Between 1976 and 2007, the percentage of state legislators who were black or Latino grew from 9 percent to 11 percent, and women’s representation skyrocketed from 8 percent to 24 percent. During the same period, the share of state legislators from blue-collar jobs fell from 5 percent to 3 percent.<sup>3</sup> Of course, these trends could simply be a coincidence. Still, they raise the troubling prospect that the political fortunes of women and minorities are tied to the political misfortunes of the working class (and vice versa).

Of course, it is difficult to predict whether increasing the number of politicians from one historically underrepresented group might decrease the descriptive representation of other historically underrepresented groups. As I see it, though, there are three conditions under which this troubling relationship may hold.

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<sup>3</sup> These occupation and race/ethnicity estimates are from the National Conference of State Legislatures (2011) and the gender estimates are from Equal Representation in Government and Democracy, <http://www.ergd.org/StateLegislatures.htm> (accessed January 5, 2011).

*First, politicians from the “new” group—from the group that is growing—do not overlap substantially with the existing groups.* If lawmakers from the working class are almost all white men, adding more working-class lawmakers could decrease the number of women and minorities in our political institutions. However, if politicians from blue-collar jobs are more likely to be women or minorities (relative to lawmakers from white-collar jobs), adding more workers would actually *increase* the descriptive representation of women or minorities, other things equal. In our political institutions, one social group can only pose a serious threat of “crowding out” another social group if the two don’t overlap.

The threat is heightened if, *second, politicians from the new group tend to run and win in the kinds of elections that favor politicians from the existing groups.* If there are certain types of elections where women and minorities tend to run and win, and if working-class candidates tend to run and win in those kinds of races, too, (and if workers are disproportionately white men) working-class candidates will tend to drive out women and minorities. If women and minorities can run and win just about anywhere, on the other hand, even if workers began winning in one “type” of election (say, for instance, in heavily working-class districts) ambitious women and minorities could simply set their sights elsewhere.

That is, unless, *third, politicians from the existing groups already run and win in almost all of the elections where they stand a chance.* If there are more than enough political offices to go around, working-class representation could increase substantially without displacing female or minority candidates. If, on the other hand, most of the offices that women and minorities tend to fill are already filled by women and minorities, increasing working-class representation could eventually pose a threat to women and minorities

(assuming, again, that workers are disproportionately white men). If women and minorities have already reached some natural limit to what they can accomplish in our political institutions, adding more white men to the mix will cost women and minorities seats.

When could working-class representation be a threat to the descriptive representation of women and minorities? If working-class candidates are mostly white men, and if they tend to run and win in the kinds of races in which women and minorities tend to run and win, and if there aren't many of those kinds of races left, increasingly the descriptive representation of working-class Americans will inevitably crowd women and minorities out of our political institutions.

Does it?

### **Evidence from the Local Elections in America Project**

To answer this question, we need information that was once hard to come by: individual-level data on a large sample of political candidates that includes information about their races, genders, and social classes.

Unfortunately, data on candidates have long been scarce, especially compared to data on other subjects, like the political opinions of ordinary Americans or the conduct of members of Congress. We know a great deal about regular citizens and a great deal about politicians. We know far less about the people in between, the citizens who choose to run for public office.

This paper takes advantage of a significant advance in research on political candidates, the Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) data base (Marschall and Shah



2013). LEAP pools data from local elections across the country, that is, elections below the state level, such as races for county offices, city offices, and special districts (like fire districts and school districts). For my purposes, this sample has two significant advantages. First, local elections are far more numerous than state or national elections—roughly 96% of the half million political offices in the United States are local offices. Moreover, these local elections tend to be far more diverse than state and national elections. If our goal is to learn whether working-class candidates run and win in places where women and minorities run and win, the best places to study are those where women, minorities, and workers run in relatively large numbers. Presidential elections won't do us any good—we need to observe races where women, minorities, *and* workers routinely make it onto the ballot. That happens most often at the local level.

I focus here on the LEAP data on elections held in California between 1995 and 2011. California is currently the only state in the LEAP data base that requires candidates to record their occupations. Moreover, California is ideal for my purposes—its political institutions are highly diverse. In 2012, the California state legislature was made up of a quarter women and a third racial or ethnic minorities (that is, members who did not identify as non-Hispanic whites).

During the 16 years covered by this sample, there were 18,363 elections below the state level in California, and 65,915 candidates ran in them. For each candidate, I first recorded whether his or her stated occupation was a *working-class job*, that is, a manual labor, service industry, or union job.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> I first simply alphabetized the occupations, then read through them and coded them as I went. Along the way, I noted terms that occurred frequently in working-class jobs:

Unfortunately, the California LEAP data do not include information about the sex, race, or ethnicity of each candidate. However, LEAP includes each candidate's first and last name. Following a growing body of research (e.g., Butler and Broockman 2011; Fryer and Levitt 2004; Word et al n.d.), I used each candidate's first name to estimate the probability that the candidate was a man, and I used the candidate's last name to estimate the probably that the candidate was white/non-Hispanic.<sup>5</sup> The social class measure that I used, then, was a simple dichotomous variable (0 for white collar, 1 for working class), and the race and

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technician, mechanic, custodian, worker, postal, crew leader, employee, labor, union, receptionist, secretary, administrative assistant, foreman, operator, equipment, teamster, maintenance, waiter, waitress, server, dish washer, bus boy, cashier, driver, and front desk. After my first pass through the list of occupations, I carried out follow-up searches for these terms to ensure that I hadn't missed any working-class jobs.

<sup>5</sup> I used a simple Bayesian framework to compute the probability that each candidate was male and white/non-Hispanic conditional on having a given name. I obtained data on the distribution of names by gender from the 1990 Census (the most recent year the Census first name file is available); see [http://www.census.gov/genealogy/www/data/1990surnames/names\\_files.html](http://www.census.gov/genealogy/www/data/1990surnames/names_files.html) (March 30, 2013). And I obtained data on the distribution of names by race and ethnicity from the 2000 Census; see <http://www.census.gov/genealogy/www/data/2000surnames/> (March 30, 2013). If a candidate's first name was not included in the sex files or if a candidate's last name was not included in the race/ethnicity files, I simply assigned the candidate the national average probability of being male or being white/non-Hispanic.

gender measures I used were probabilities that ranged from 0 to 1 (although because most names tend to be sharply divided by gender or race, most values were close to 0 or 1).

### **Who Runs? And Who Wins?**

California's local elections are diverse contests. Simply looking at the descriptive data in the LEAP dataset is illuminating.

The LEAP dataset covers three jurisdictions—city-, county-, and school-district-level elections—and three branches—legislative offices (i.e. city councils, county commissions, school boards), administrative offices, and executive offices. Figure 1 plots the percentages of women (top row), minorities (middle row), and workers (bottom row) in elections in each jurisdiction (left column) and each branch of government (right column). (Appendix Table A1 reports more detailed summary statistics.) In each panel, each pair of bars plots the percentage of *candidates* who were, for instance, women, and the percentage of *winners* who were, too.

[Figure 1 about here]

Viewed this way, the LEAP data already have several important lessons to teach us. First, women and minorities are better represented in local elections in California than working-class candidates. In every level and branch of local government in California, working-class citizens—who make up a majority of the labor force in the United States—make up less than 5% of candidates and less than 3% of officeholders. (These figures are consistent with a longstanding body of research on the near-absence of working-class people in political offices; e.g., Carnes 2013; Matthews 1954a; Pessen 1984). Second, each historically-underrepresented group—women, minorities, and workers—fares better in

smaller jurisdictions, that is, each group runs more often and wins more often in school district elections than in county races. Third, whereas women tend to win more elections than they lose—they make up a larger percentage of winners than of candidates—racial and ethnic minorities and working-class candidates tend to be screened out in elections at slightly higher rates than whites and white-collar professionals.

Most importantly for present purposes, the large numbers of women and minorities who run for office and win in California already casts doubt on the second condition outlined above, namely, that women and minorities have a “type” of election that working-class candidates might encroach on. Women make up 40% of school district candidates and 45% of school district winners; minorities make up 30 to 35%. At first glance, these numbers seem much larger than we might expect if we believed that there were particular “types” of elections that favored these groups—say, elections in places where voters are more politically progressive or where women and minorities vote in larger numbers. Of course, there may be types of elections that give women and minorities advantages on the margins (e.g., Trounstine and Valdini 2008). However, the sheer numbers of women and minorities who run and win in California casts doubt on the idea that these groups have hard-and-fast electoral niches. It seems more likely that they don’t, that women and minorities can win in many types of elections in California.

How do these data compare to the three conditions described above? What can local elections in California teach us about the future of political representation for women, minorities, and the working class?

## Are Working-class Candidates a Bunch of White Guys?

First, how much do politicians from the “new” group overlap with the existing groups? If blue-collar candidates are mostly white men, their success at the polls could spell trouble for women and racial and ethnic minorities.

[Figure 2 about here]

They are not, however: White men make up *a minority* of working-class candidates. The left panel of Figure 2 plots the numbers and percentages of working-class candidates who fell into four categories: white men, white women, non-white men (that is, men who were not white/non-Hispanic), and non-white women. Contrary to popular images of working-class Americans as white men, white men only made up 43% of the working-class candidates in California from 1995 to 2011. Fully 30% of working-class candidates were women—17% of all working-class candidates were white women, and 13% were women of color. Non-white men made up 27% of working-class candidates. For the last decade and a half, white men have made up a minority of working-class candidates.

Moreover, candidates from white-collar jobs were actually *more* likely to be white men than candidates from working-class jobs were. The right panel of Figure 2 plots the racial and gender makeup of candidates from white-collar (that is, not-working-class) occupations. In sharp contrast to the idea that working-class candidates pose a threat to women and minorities, working-class candidates are *more likely* to be women and minorities themselves.

This finding is squarely in line with what we know about ordinary Americans: men and white people tend to have more prestigious occupations and tend to earn higher incomes than women and minorities (e.g., Bobbitt-Zeher 2007; Goldin 1990; Loury 1977;

Smith 1997; Smith and Welch 1986; Wright 1978). The same seems to be true for political candidates: like working-class Americans, working-class candidates are more likely to be women and racial or ethnic minorities.

Other things equal, increasing the share of candidates and officeholders from the working class would actually *increase* the total share of candidates who were women and minorities. Is working-class representation a threat to women and minorities? It doesn't seem to be—compared to white-collar government, government by the working class would actually be more diverse along racial and gender lines.

### **Do White Working-class Men Run in the Same Elections as Women and Minorities?**

Moreover, the working-class candidates who *are* white men don't seem to run in the same kinds of races as women and minorities. In fact, it isn't clear that there *are* particular kinds of local races in California that significantly favor women and minorities.

[Figure 3 about here]

The LEAP data show essentially no relationship between the number of women or minorities who run for office in a given election and the number of white working-class men who run. Figure 3 uses the California LEAP data to plot the number of candidates who were white working-class men (each point represents a single election) against the number of candidates who were women (left panel) and the number who were racial or ethnic minorities (right panel). There is essentially no relationship in either panel. White working-class men don't flock to the races that draw large numbers of women and minorities, or vice versa. If there *is* a distinct type of local election in California where women or racial

and ethnic minorities prefer to run for office, white working-class men aren't seeking it out at disproportionate rates.

[Figure 4 about here]

Nor are they seeking out elections where women and minorities typically *win*. Figure 4 plots the results of a simple regression modeling exercise (reported in its entirety in Appendix Table A2). I first regressed the probability that a woman or (separately) a minority would win in each *county* election<sup>6</sup> in California on a variety of characteristics of counties: the percentage of the two-party vote Obama received in that county in 2012, the county's population, the median household income, the unemployment rate, the percentage of residents who were white/non-Hispanic, the median age, the percentage of the county that was urban, and the percentage of the county that was female.<sup>7</sup> I then used the resulting model to predict the odds that a woman or a minority would win in each county election based on the characteristics of the county itself. If women or minorities have an electoral niche, and if white working-class men seek it out, it should be evident here.

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<sup>6</sup> Unfortunately, I could not obtain these data for smaller geographic units.

<sup>7</sup> Data on population sizes and the racial makeup of counties were from <http://www.censusscope.org/2010Census/PDFs/RaceEth-Counties.pdf> . Data on unemployment and age were from <http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/county-level-data-sets/unemployment.aspx#.UUPvL7TxePU> . Data on gender were from <http://www.census.gov/popest/data/counties/asrh/2011/CC-EST2011-agesex.html> . And data on urbanization were from [http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/ualists\\_layout.html](http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/ua/ualists_layout.html) .

Figure 4 plots the predicted probability of a female or minority victory in each county election (on the vertical axis) against the proportion of candidates in each race who were white working-class men. Two things are worth noting. First, the regression models underlying these estimates were surprisingly imprecise. Both had  $R^2$  estimates under 0.04. Women were significantly more likely to win in counties with lower unemployment rates; minorities were significantly more likely to win in counties that were more urban and where more minorities lived. Overall, however, these characteristics—and the others I controlled for, including Obama’s vote share in the 2012 election—were lousy predictors of female and minority representation. Again, women and minorities did not appear to have a “type” of local election in California.

And if they do, it doesn’t seem to be the type where white working-class men run in large numbers. In the left panel of Figure 4, the relationship between the proportion of candidates who are white working-class men and the likelihood of a minority winning office actually appears weakly negative: if anything, white working-class men tend *not* to run in the places where racial and ethnic minorities tend to win elections.

Likewise, the right panel of Figure 4 finds essentially no relationship between the share of candidates who are white working-class men and the likelihood that a woman will win a county election. White men from the working class don’t seem to pose any special threat of running against women and minorities on “their” turf—there doesn’t even seem to be such a thing in local elections in California.



## **Are There Any Elections Left for White Working-class Men?**

Even if women and minorities were rare among working-class candidates (although they aren't) and even if women and minorities had particular "types" of elections (although they don't seem to) and even if working-class candidates tended to run and win in those types of elections (although they don't seem to, either), there are still many elections where white working-class men could run without displacing women or minorities. I find no evidence to support the third condition outlined above. Politicians from the existing groups *do not* already run and win in almost all of the elections where they stand a chance in California. There is room for more working-class candidates—and more female and minority candidates, too.

Figure 5 summarizes the numbers of local elections in California in 2012 where white-collar men made up tiny shares of the candidate pool (farther left on the horizontal axis) and larger shares of the candidate pool (farther right). That is, Figure 5 summarizes the number of races that featured few or no women, minorities, *or* working-class candidates.

[Figure 5 about here]

Although women and minorities run and win at impressive rates in local elections in California, many elections in the state still feature mostly white-collar white guys. In total, there were 18,363 local elections in California from 1995 to 2011. In 3,946 (21.5%) of those elections, women, minorities, and the working class made up less than 20% of the candidate pool—in other words, they essentially weren't there. The percentage of candidates from the working class could triple—all within this band of elections that

currently feature almost all white-collar white men. At least in California, there's still plenty of room at the top.

### **Is Working-class Representation a Threat to Women and Minorities?**

The evidence presented here suggests that concerns about working-class representation threatening the descriptive representation of women and minorities are probably overblown. Compared to white-collar candidates, working-class candidates are actually *more* likely to be women and minorities. The white working-class men who run, moreover, don't seem to thrive in the types of elections that women and minorities need to stay in office—there don't even seem to *be* types of elections that women and minorities need to stay in office. At the local level, there are plenty of political offices to go around.

In short, none of the three conditions that should alert us to a potential conflict between the descriptive representation of different social groups are met in the LEAP data on California elections. Working-class representation doesn't appear to pose any risk of displacing female and minority politicians any time in the immediate future.

Of course, the data I've analyzed in this paper come from just one group of elections in one state. Perhaps the ties between women, minorities, and workers are unusually rosy in local elections in California. Perhaps they are frostier in elections for state and federal offices. Or in elections in other states where women or minorities may have electoral niches. Studying the LEAP data from California's local elections is instructive, but it's still possible that working-class representation could pose a threat to women and minorities in other times and places.

The available data suggest that it isn't likely, however. For example, the 2012 National Candidate Study (Broockman, Carnes, Crowder-Meyer, and Skovron 2012)—a national survey of the 10,131 people who ran for the 6,015 state legislative seats that were up for election at that time<sup>8</sup>—found that, like local elections in California, only about 3% of the candidates who ran in state legislative elections nationwide were from the working class in 2012. Of those, 27% identified themselves as racial or ethnic minorities. By comparison, among candidates from white-collar occupations, only 15% identified themselves as racial or ethnic minorities. Women were less common among working-class candidates in this dataset: only about 8% of working-class candidates were women, whereas about 29% of white-collar candidates were. However, there was essentially no statistically meaningful (or substantively significant) relationship between the percentage of female candidates in an election and the percentage of white working-class candidates (nor was there any relationship between class and race). In state legislative races nationwide, white working-class candidates don't seem to seek out the elections where women or racial and ethnic minorities run.

Likewise, national-level data show no signs of impending conflicts between working-class representation and the representation of women or minorities. The Congressional Leadership and Social Status (CLASS) dataset (Carnes 2013) includes detailed biographical data on the members of Congress who held office between 1999 and 2008. During that timeframe, the average female member of Congress spent about 3 percent of her precongressional career in working-class jobs, while the average male

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<sup>8</sup> The survey achieved a 19% response rate—close to 2,000 state legislative candidates completed the survey (see Broockman and Skovron 2013).

members spent just 1 percent. The average white member spent an average of 1 percent as well, compared to 3 percent among the average black or Hispanic member and 5 percent among the average Asian member. The significant overlap between the working class and other historically underrepresented groups that we see in local candidates in California seems to be present at higher levels in the political process.

Those of us who care about the descriptive representation of historically underrepresented groups should continue keeping an eye on these relationships, of course. There is no evidence that working-class representation poses a threat to the representation of women and minorities today, but of course, that could change. Achieving representational equality will be a long and difficult process: it is good to occasionally ask whether the success of one group is occurring at the expense of others.

Fortunately, that doesn't seem to be the case here—for now, we can advocate greater working-class representation without worrying that we are undoing the gains that other important groups have made. Working-class candidates don't pose a threat to women or minorities. Most of them *are* women or minorities.

## Appendix

Appendix Table A1: Summary statistics for Figure 1

Candidates						
	Schools	Cities	Counties	Leg.	Admin.	Execs.
Women	11,117 (40.2%)	9,758 (31.3%)	1,407 (25.3%)	19,200 (35.4%)	1,387 (37.9%)	1,695 (26.4%)
Minorities	9,643 (34.9%)	10,443 (33.5%)	1,614 (29.0%)	18,527 (34.1%)	1,112 (30.4%)	2,057 (32.0%)
Workers	1,109 (4.0%)	1,272 (4.1%)	83 (1.5%)	2,268 (4.2%)	43 (1.2%)	153 (2.4%)
Winners						
	Schools	Cities	Counties	Leg.	Admin.	Execs.
Women	3,315 (45.5%)	3,064 (37.8%)	685 (26.2%)	5,320 (40.1%)	1,053 (43.2%)	689 (26.8%)
Minorities	2,379 (32.6%)	2,696 (33.2%)	686 (26.3%)	4,289 (33.0%)	695 (28.5%)	776 (30.1%)
Workers	154 (2.1%)	152 (1.9%)	12 (0.4%)	280 (2.2%)	16 (0.6%)	22 (0.8%)

*Source:* Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) data base (Marschall and Shah 2013).

*Note:* Cells report the number of candidates from the group in question in the type of election in question (and, in parentheses, the percentage of candidates from that group).

Appendix Table A2: Regression models used in Figure 4

	Probability female wins election	Probability minority wins election
2012 Obama vote	0.14 (0.12)	-0.03 (0.07)
Population	0.06 (0.10)	-0.08 (0.06)
Median household income	-0.12 (0.13)	-0.14+ (0.08)
Unemployment	-1.50** (0.50)	-0.52 (0.32)
White (non-Hispanic)	0.02 (0.15)	-0.39** (0.10)
Median age	0.19 (0.26)	0.43* (0.17)
Urban	0.07 (0.10)	0.14* (0.06)
Female	0.85 (0.55)	0.07 (0.35)
Intercept	-0.13 (0.28)	0.21 (0.18)
<i>N</i>	1,447	1,447
<i>R</i> <sup>2</sup>	0.031	0.038

*Source:* Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) data base (Marschall and Shah 2013).

*Note:* Cells report coefficients from regression models relating the variables listed at the top of the column to the explanatory variables. +*p* < 0.10; \**p* < 0.05; \*\**p* < 0.01, two tailed.

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Figure 1: The percentages of women, minorities, and workers in California elections, by jurisdiction (left column) and branch (right column)

*Source:* Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) data base (Marschall and Shah 2013).

Figure 2: The racial and gender makeup of working-class and white-collar candidates in local elections in California

*Source:* Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) data base (Marschall and Shah 2013).

Figure 3: Do white working-class men run in the same elections as women and minorities?

*Source:* Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) data base (Marschall and Shah 2013).

Figure 4: Do white working-class men run where women and minorities win?

*Source:* Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) data base (Marschall and Shah 2013).

Figure 5: Can white working-class men run without displacing women or minorities?

*Source:* Local Elections in America Project (LEAP) data base (Marschall and Shah 2013).